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Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to examine the root cause of the populist backlash 
that has been so prominent in recent western democracies. Populist backlashes have 
occurred with frequency over time, however since the turn of the 21st Century, they have 
occurred with increased frequency and effectiveness. This is largely due to a disconnect 
between political and media elites and the general public. I propose two models; the 
“fragment theory” and the “feedback loop” theory to help explain the increased 
effectiveness of populist movements. The “fragment theory” is the idea that fringe 
political parties are able to challenge mainstream parties and gain significant support by 
appealing to the public on major issues that are poorly addressed by main stream 
parties. The “feedback loop” theory is the idea that fringe candidates and parties have a 
mutual, symbiotic relationship in which the media relies on candidates for extreme 
rhetoric and advertisement revenue while the extremist candidate or party relies on the 
media for legitimacy. While this paper is not a comprehensive overview of nationalism or 
populism in every country, it focuses primarily on populism in the United States, Britain, 
and France. Finally, this paper examines the future of populism and whether young 
people will continue the recent trend of populist success. 
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On June 23rd, 2016, the voters of Britain elected to leave the European Union in a 
historic and shocking referendum. It was a referendum that was deemed nearly 
impossible and unlikely by virtually every political pundit. A large number of economists 
and politicians had advised against leaving the European Union. The shocking result 
represented a blind spot in both the political elite and polling researchers. How did a 
referendum that was behind as much as ten points in the polling just a month out, result 
in such a decisive victory for the Leave campaign? The Brexit vote and the speculation 
prior to the referendum indicates a disconnect between the media, political elite, and the 
masses. However, Brexit would not be the final or even the most shocking populist 
victory of 2016. On November 8th, 2016, Americans elected Donald Trump which 
marked the stunning defeat of Hillary Clinton, a political insider and the candidate who 
was projected to defeat Trump in a landslide victory. Both Brexit and Trump are clear 
indications of citizens feeling disdain for their current political systems and looking for 
alternatives or a chance for retribution toward the political institutions and candidates 
which they felt had abandoned them. This was largely the resultant of candidates and 
systems being fairly unresponsive to public concerns. Indeed, one of the most prominent 
issues facing both Britain and the United States revolved around immigration. Both the 
Republican Party and Democratic Party as well as the mainstream British parties failed to 
address these concerns for many voters, with but two exceptions, Donald Trump and The 
United Kingdom Independence Party. This failure was in addition to Congress setting 
low levels of approval ratings and the European Parliament also facing a number of 
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problems with public perception and a lingering economic recession. The election of 
Donald Trump and the Brexit decision are largely the resultant of political elites failing to 
properly frame the argument and a failure to propose effective legislation to address the 
concerns of European and American citizens. 
 This paper proposes two critical theories to understand why populist candidates 
arise and what makes them so successful. The first theory is called the “fragment theory”. 
The fragment theory effectively explains why populist candidates in Europe, and to a 
lesser extent America, are able to shift from fringe political candidates or movements to 
mainstream challengers. Eurosceptic parties often take a position on either one or a few 
relevant political issues concerning the public. These are issues that are generally poorly 
addressed by larger, mainstream political parties, yet still fundamental issues within the 
voter-base. Mainstream political parties attempt to avoid large and difficult issues such as 
immigration and social welfare, which tend to be more divisive issues, as to not alienate 
large portions of the voters. This in turn, leads to a platform void in which populist 
movements and Eurosceptic movements have attempted to fill. While these issues may 
begin as fringe and minute problems, because parties are reluctant to address it and 
policy is difficult to craft around it, they manifest into larger and eventually significant 
problems. With regards to issues such as immigration, the free movement of peoples 
began in Europe with the founding of the European Community in the 1950’s and 
immigration across the Mexican border has been a political issue in America since the 
1980’s. These issues have not been addressed properly by any form of policy and have 
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thus compounded. As a result, populist campaigns have focused on a single issue, like 
immigration, and then slowly expanded their base from that issue as their party has 
grown in size. This is particularly notable in Europe, in which many countries have a 
plurality of parties rather than a duality; thus, parties are far less diverse in ideology and 
it is easier for constituents to shift political allegiance without a notable shift in political 
platform.  
 The second theory I propose is the ‘feedback loop’ theory. The feedback loop 
theory is the idea that the media and extreme candidates have a mutual interest and 
symbiotic relationship. Media outlets cover extreme parties or candidates for the 
purposes of garnering television ratings, headline clicks, or newspaper sales. The 
candidate also relies on the media for press coverage and legitimacy. The fact that major 
news corporations addressed Donald Trump as “presidential hopeful” or “2016 
Republican candidate” only served to solidify Donald Trump as a serious threat to take 
the White House. For the media, Donald Trump was the perfect candidate, a repeatable 
soundboard to be aired over and over. He was a candidate that seemingly presented new 
material every week and as a result, landed as a major political headline every week. For 
the purposes of this theory, I do not include forms of social media as part of the feedback 
loop theory. While Donald Trump used his Twitter account extensively in the run up to 
his election, social media platforms are largely subscriber based, meaning users must opt 
into following Trump’s messages to receive them. Additionally, while Twitter does 
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benefit from a large user base, it does not receive the same benefits for viewership or 
clicks. Additionally, Twitter does not give Donald Trump any further legitimacy as a 
presidential candidate, only a platform for his message. 
 These two theories in large part explain why populist candidates or parties are 
able to shift from fringe movements to mainstream challengers. However, each theory’s 
applicability depends on the country. It is certainly true that the fragment theory fails to 
explain why America is still a two-party system, despite problems with both parties. 
However, competitors such as the Libertarian or the Constitution Party may indicate that 
fragment theory works well in localized elections. It may be an unrelated phenomenon as 
it seems most local candidates have difficulty translating their message into significant 
voter presence, but requires additional research beyond the scope of this paper. On the 
contrary, while the “feedback loop” theory may apply to American politics, it is not 
necessarily applicable to Europe in the same way. One of the most notable differences 
between American and European politics seems to be the role of the 24-hour news cycle. 
Many European countries have a 24-hour news channel, but they are less influential and 
less polarized than American cable news networks. In the case of Britain, the BBC is a 
state-run broadcast and far less subjected to the whims of the advertising world than a 
cable-based news network might be. Additionally, given the duality of the American 
political system and the current stark ideological contrast between the parties, it seems far 
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more likely that commercial news networks attempt to capitalize on those ideological 
demographics. 
 
Populism: An Explanation and Historical Overview 
 
Populism, a word that has been abuzz since the election of Donald Trump, is 
aptly described as a grassroots movement dedicated to restoring power to the common 
people. There is some debate whether populism is rooted in a set of principles or a style 
of campaign or movement. For the purposes of this paper, it is both. Populism is 
indisputably linked to the concerns of common people, but after examination of 
Eurosceptic parties and the 2016 presidential election, it is also deeply rooted in the style 
of campaign. Populist candidates or movements often brand themselves as “anti-
establishment” and the origins of populist movements usually focus around a single issue 
before expanding to broader policy issues. Often, they are a reaction to a relatively 
inattentive Parliament or Congress. Political questions that are large, divisive, and often 
do not have easy solutions are prime candidates for grassroots support to swell around. 
This section of the paper will focus around the history of populism and nationalism in the 
United States. While Europe has had a long, extensive history with nationalism, 
particularly in the early 20th Century, this paper is not comprehensive enough to delve 
into the wide history of nationalism across every country in Europe. Rather, this section 
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will be an overview of the goals of populism and nationalism and what roles they have 
historically played in elections. 
Populism has been an integral part of American history. This is a country founded 
upon populist ideas and an anti-establishment movement during the American 
Revolution. Harry Watson, a historian at the Smithsonian Museum, said, “Early populist 
notions appeared in the rhetoric of 19th-century English radicals who warned of an eternal 
struggle between liberty, virtue, and the common good against corrupt and tyrannical 
courtiers. Their ideas spread and evolved in the American Revolution, as the ‘war for the 
home rule’ became a ‘war over who should rule home.” (Watson, 2016) It is only natural 
that America has had a long and extensive history and the sentiments of the “self-made 
man” are still present today. The earliest roots of populism in the United States lie within 
the Tennessee valley and the beginning of Andrew Jackson’s presidential campaign. 
Andrew Jackson was a Southerner and widely hailed as a Washington outsider and a man 
of the common people. His 1828 presidential slogan was even “Andrew Jackson and the 
will of the people” and he was known as “Old Hickory” for his humble, rural roots. 
(Watson, 2016) Yet, it was not just Jackson’s background which made him America’s 
first populist president, it was also his conduct. He was notorious for inviting his rowdy 
constituent base to the White House for his inauguration and subsequently trashing it. 
One witness described it, “The Majesty of the People had disappeared… A rabble, a 
mob, of boys, negroes, women, children, scrambling fighting, romping… The whole 
White House had been inundated by the rabble mob”. As Watson puts it, “Mrs. Smith 
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probably exaggerated, and the melee stemmed more from poor planning than innate 
barbarism, but she perfectly captured the attitude of America’s ‘better sort’ to the mass of 
farmers, artisans, tradesman, and laborers who now had final authority in its 
government” (Watson, 2016). Andrew Jackson carried many of his constituent’s 
concerns with him to the White House; he feared the Federal Reserve and the banking 
industry providing advantages for political insiders. Yet most importantly, Jackson 
marked the first time a president had been elected from outside the political or intellectual 
elite. While he was renowned for his victory at the Battle of New Orleans, he was far 
from the class of political elites that had inhabited the role of the presidency previously.  
Despite Andrew Jackson’s popularity amongst commoners, populism would have 
limited future impact in future presidential elections and in American politics until the 
late 19th century. This was in large part due to the emergence of the Whig Party and a 
series of unpopular policies from Jacksonian Democrats. Yet, a new populist wave would 
flourish nearly half a century later. In 1892, at the Industrial Conference in St. Louis, 
Missouri, the People’s Party was launched. In their manifesto they said, “We seek to 
restore the government of the Republic to the hands of ‘the plain people’ with whose 
class it originated.” Laura Grattan, in her book Populism’s Power, said, “The Populist 
movement began in the experimental spaces of the agrarian and labor movements of the 
1870’s and 1880’s, as farmers and laborers invented alternatives to the everyday rituals 
of domination that had for decades marked their horizons of economic and political 
possibility.” (Grattan, 50) Populism garnered tremendous momentum in the late 19th 
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century and clashed with many other political interest groups that composed mainstream 
parties. The People’s Party and its constituents had many similarities with Socialist or 
Labor parties. So much, that these parties feared the success of the People’s Party. Yet, 
as Grattan notes, the People’s Party had one distinct difference that has been a hallmark 
of populism: a heavy nationalistic identity. She says, “At worst, we remember Populism 
as a nostalgic backlash against capitalist modernization, as notable for its racist, nativist, 
and patriarchal rhetoric as for its economic grievances” (Grattan, 51). However, this is a 
rather limited and poorly developed examination of populism. Certainly, there is a 
substantial element of nationalism within populist 18th century movements and today. 
However, the primary efforts of the People’s Party and other populist movements were 
rooted in combating a form of crony-capitalism and governmental overreach, which they 
saw as a breach of the purpose of the Republic. Accusations of racism are often 
grotesquely exaggerated. Early populist movements were egalitarian and relied heavily 
on black farmers and laborers. While they were nationalistic and perhaps even 
xenophobic, because many populists lived in the Midwest and South, the movement is 
incorrectly conflated as a movement motivated by racism. Many of these constituents 
were racist, however, to suggest that racism was a platform of many early populist 
movements is unfounded.  John Lukacs in his book Democracy and Populism says, “The 
populists mostly came from the Midwest and South, they believed in reform arising from 
the lower classes” (Lukacs, 58). Areas of the country in which populist movements were 
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largely successful were areas in which slavery was an integral part of life and following 
the Civil War, Jim Crow became an integral part of life. This is precisely why I argue 
that racism is incorrectly attributed to populism. Yet, given that many populist 
movements are nativist in nature, it begs the question why did these movements arise in 
the Midwest and South? Populism is a movement largely grounded in a belief of the self-
made man and ideas of self-governance. The idea of the self-made man was born on the 
frontier and it is only natural that populist, and even conservative ideas, were rooted in 
places where self-sufficiency was a requirement and the reaches of the government were 
limited.1 Culturally, the Midwest and South still hold these populist roots. 
John Lukacs notes this significant political shift towards populism for laborers in 
America. He attributes the shift to an ideological split in the Democratic party during the 
early 1900’s. He says, “The Democratic party – mostly, though not exclusively, because 
of its strength in the South – included and absorbed the Populists, whose political party, 
by and large disappeared.” (Lukacs, 58) He explains further, “At the same time, the 
Democratic Party began to appeal to the industrial working class as well as to most 
immigrants. By about 1910 (though not yet in the South), they had become, by and large, 
the more liberal party of the two. (Lukacs, 58) Lukacs notes the first shifting of the 
Democratic Party away from its populist roots and towards a more progressive leaning. 
                                                          
1 In this context, I mean the conservative way of life, not necessarily the ideology. However, the ideology 
is increasingly becoming a defining characteristic of the South with the consistent election of Republican 
candidates in many public office seats. 
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The union of progressives and populists was merely one of convenience rather than one 
of necessity or ideological similarities. Not only had the Democratic party become the 
more liberal party, but they had become significantly more progressive as the result of 
changing demographics. These changes occurred largely on the coast, in larger cities, and 
at universities. “They were no longer the reform-minded Republicans of the upper 
classes. American intellectuals and what may be called the American Intelligentsia – a 
new phenomenon, a class marked not only by their social province but by their ideas and 
opinions were, with very few exceptions, proponents and partisans of political and social 
reforms – in one word progressives.” (Lukacs, 59) This marked a sudden shift by the 
Democratic party ideologically towards the left. This is evident with candidates such as 
Woodrow Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt, who were far more progressive than many 
of their Southern Democratic counterparts. Increasingly, the Midwest and Southern 
populists became both a liability for the Democratic party and ideologically isolated.2 
Lukacs also notes, “However, these liberal intellectuals and professionals still believed in 
political and social reforms from above. They regarded themselves, surely mentally, as 
superior to ‘the people’ whom they wished to assist and reform.” (Lukacs, 59) In 
addition to ideological differences, this elitism divided the Democratic party heavily and 
once again manifested itself in the 2016 election. Distrust between intellectual elites and 
                                                          
2 It is worth noting that despite Woodrow Wilson being a more progressive candidate, he was notoriously 
racist and as a result would have still likely been accepted by Southern Democrats even if they did not 
agree with his policy proposals. 
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populists was instrumental in the widening gap within the Democratic party. The ability 
to be both a populist and progressive, such as Henry Ford or Calvin Coolidge, virtually 
evaporated by the 1920s.3 According to Lukacs, “a few years later the divorce of 
populists and progressives was final… the remaining old progressives were 
internationalists, while the Populists were nationalists – indeed, American national 
socialists of a kind.” (Lukacs, 61) 
One area in which John Lukacs does expand his discussion is the idea of “anti-
intellectualism” within populism. This was an argument proposed by Richard Hofstadter 
in Anti-Intellectualism in American Life. He critiqued populism as anti-intellectual and 
this is not entirely true. Lukacs does note that the initial splitting of the populists and 
progressives occurred in 1925 around the debate between creationism and evolution, but 
rather, this seems more indicative of a key populist figure, William Jennings Bryan, 
against that of science rather than the entire populist platform (Lukacs, 60). It is also 
worth noting, populism is not inherently anti-intellectual. Indeed, as Lukacs argues, 
populists do subscribe to intellectual thought and critique ideological opponents, much in 
the same way that progressives subscribed to their intellectuals. Both sides have a 
penchant for describing other intellectuals as “psuedo-intellectuals”. Thus, as Lukacs 
argues, Hofstadter’s argument is just as much an argument of pseudo-intelligentsia as he 
                                                          
3 Calvin Coolidge is perhaps the last ‘progressive’ Republican candidate as following his Presidency, 
Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Democratic Party came to occupy progressivism.  
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accuses the populists of making. Hofstadter’s arguments highlight the penchant for 
intellectual superiority that Lukacs has described amongst early 20th Century progressives 
and intelligentsia. This is a trend that has continued amongst both populists and 
progressives into the 21st Century, with examples such as Donald Trump calling the 
media “fake news”. It seems more commonly “anti-intellectualism” has been a form of 
discrediting ideological opponents rather than a true penchant for ignoring intellectual 
truths.  
Two of the most prominent modern populist movements in the United States 
occurred relatively recently and have had lasting effects on the political landscape. The 
Tea Party movement is perhaps the most prominent movement in the past several 
decades. The Tea Party movement represented a shift by strong conservative voters who 
were unhappy with Republican representation under the Obama administration. The 
movement was nothing short of a hostile take-over of the Republican Party by a group of 
hardline Conservatives distraught from weak Republican leadership. “Tea Partiers” felt 
that moderate Republicans were failing to represent their interests and caving to 
Democratic pressure. Several prominent Republican seats were openly challenged by Tea 
Party organizations which ultimately culminated with the defeat of Eric Cantor, then 
House Majority leader, and the resignation of former Speaker of the House, John 
Boehner. The defeat of two of the most prominent Republican figures was truly a 
remarkable turning point for the Tea Party. It was perhaps the first signal that the 
grassroots movement was a force to be reckoned within the Republican Party. In contrast, 
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the Occupy Wall Street movement is rooted much more in policy change rather than 
party change. The movement was heavily focused in consumer protection and concerned 
with corporate greed. While the Occupy movement may be more concerned policy 
change, it undoubtedly played a significant role in the 2016 Presidential election and was 
largely responsible for Bernie Sanders’ initial success. What is most noteworthy about 
both these movements was their ability to shift the debate. Laura Grattan described the 
movements as “competing populist responses to the crises of neoliberalism democracy in 
the twenty-first century.” (Grattan, 144)4 She notes that, while both the Tea Party and 
Occupy movement are politically at odds, they both ask the fundamental question of a 
populist movement; “whom or what has been harmed, and by whom.” (Grattan, 144) 
However, Grattan incorrectly associates the Tea Party movement with an identarian 
backlash. She argues, “The Tea Party’s thrived because think tanks, elected officials, and 
a powerful right-wing echo chamber were able to contrive resonant assemblages to 
centralize rhetoric and identification. The Tea Party, who, in turn, constituted popular 
power to support neoliberal and reactionary policies. Specifically, the Tea Party’s 
resonance machine tapped into America’s regulated populist imaginary to update the 
familiar narrative brought to us by Chevrolet – one in which ‘real Americans’ must 
defend unlimited and individual freedom for a nation people defined as white, male, and 
Christian.” (Grattan, 141) As I have argued in this paper, the modern populist backlash is 
                                                          
4 The crises of neoliberalism is generally considered the failure of governments to be responsive to public 
demand. 
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not an identitarian movement, but rather a political backlash. Grattan, along with many 
other scholars, seem to incorrectly conflate the two. For example, the Tea Party argument 
against Mexican immigration is entirely policy-driven. These “white, male, and 
Protestant” voters do not argue that there are ‘too many non-whites entering the country’, 
but rather, they argue that Mexican migrants are coming across the border using the 
American social welfare system, driving down wages, and taking jobs from Americans. 
Whether this is a correct assessment or not is irrelevant, these are economic and policy 
arguments, not ethno-nationalist arguments. The conflation between the two is also 
commonly levied against Eurosceptic groups and demonstrates a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the goals and motives of each populist group. Furthermore, 
Grattan’s argument seems to ignore the primary objective of the Tea Party movement, 
which was to elect more conservative Republicans to Congress.  
The Occupy Wall Street movement was quite different to the Tea Party movement 
both in terms of scope and objective. Laura Grattan argues it was both a populist 
backlash but also an ideological response to the Tea Party. She says, “Instead, some 
scholars called for a left populism to counter the Tea Party. Behind this exhortation was 
the belief the Left needed its own oppositional rhetoric – one that could arouse 
widespread collective identification to resist global capitalism and the corporate-state 
mergers that have distorted democracy.” (Grattan, 145) However, it is also worth noting 
the difference in approach between Occupy and the Tea Party movement. While the Tea 
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Party movement appealed to strong conservatives within the Republican Party, Occupy 
Wall Street appealed across demographics with its phrase “we are the 99%”. Laura 
Grattan calls this a ‘horizontalization’ or decentralization of popular power, in contrast to 
the Tea Party movement, which was ironically, an attempt to centralize power into a few 
key members of Congress for political change. However, it would also be this 
“horizontalism” that would cause significant problems for the Occupy movement. Unlike 
the Tea Party, the Occupy Wall Street movement was extremely disorganized with very 
few effective leaders or central voices. Furthermore, because it tried to encompass “the 
99%”, it failed to unify a plurality of voices and ideologies that ranged from anarchism to 
communism. There was seemingly no objective solution presented by the Occupy 
movement. In contrast, the Tea Party’s objective goal of influencing Congress through 
political pressure or electing more conservative voices was an end-game goal, and quite 
effective. The Tea Party was extremely effective at galvanizing electoral support, an area 
in which the Occupy movement objectively failed. The Occupy movement was born out 
of frustration with an entire political and economic system, while the Tea Party was born 
out of frustration with individual party members. Not only were the goals of Occupy 
lofty, they were unachievable in comparison to the goal of the Tea Party. In fact, the only 
seemingly noticeable outcome the Occupy movement had on the political landscape is an 
openness to Bernie Sanders. Prior to the Occupy movement, Bernie Sanders was a fringe 
Socialist party member with a very small following and it is very likely that his rise in the 
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Democratic primaries can be directly attributed to the Occupy Wall Street movement 
shifting the debate.  
One crucial aspect of populism, particularly in its earliest forms but also 
currently, is nationalism. There are two subsets of nationalism. The first is the idea that a 
country’s primary focus should be maximizing the well-being of its citizens. The second 
subset of nationalism is the idea of a national identity that citizens should conform to. 
This second subset is less concerned with political aspects of a nation and more 
concerned with the racial and ethnic aspects of the nation, often referred to as ethno-
nationalism. Populist parties have difficulty maintaining this balance as the two are often 
intrinsically linked between insiders and outsiders. Maximizing the well-being of 
citizenry inherently requires that there are insiders and outsiders. Sam Pryke notes two 
different theories surrounding nationalism; the first was prominent prior to World War II 
and it is the theory that nations, while not necessarily ethnically homogenous, were 
consistent over time. In contrast, modernist theories surrounding nationalism are 
substantially different. Pryke says, “The modernist account of nations and nationalism 
denies, by contrast, that there is any intrinsic relationship between ethnicity and 
nationalism. Instead, the various writers associated with this approach argue that nations 
and nationalism are of far more recent vintage, the product of social, economic, and 
political transformations of the past 250 years of human history.” (Pryke, 4) In other 
words, the idea of nationalism is a relatively new invention in history, but correlated with 
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the birth of America. Adrian Hastings, a critic of this view of nationalism, says “a nation 
is a far more self-conscious community than an ethnicity. Formed from one or more 
ethnicities it possesses or claims the right to political identity and autonomy as a people, 
together with control of a specified territory.” (Hastings, 10) This view of nationalism is 
a very American-centric view of nationalism, in part because America was born out of a 
political and cultural identity among pluralistic ethnicities. The same is true for parts of 
Europe, particularly in countries like Belgium or in the Balkans where there is high 
ethnic divide. However, it could be argued that there are stronger sentiments of 
nationalism within Europe particularly because they have not had the same degree of 
ethnic mixing that has been a hallmark of American life. Given Europe’s extensive and 
ugly history with ethnicity, particularly of the Jews, it seems that Hastings model begins 
to break down. Certainly, in some parts of Europe there is an undeniable link between 
ethnicity and nation (countries like Germany and France which have both a strong 
national identity and high level of ethnic homogenization). However, America and 
Europe have substantially different experiences with nationalism. In fact, applying 
Hastings view of nationalism to America would further debunk the link between 
populism and ethnic nationalism. Sam Pryke has a different view on the rise of 
nationalism; he says, “So nations give rise to nationalism and nationalists demand nation-
states to further their interests.” (Pryke, 5) He subscribes to the notion that as nations 
solidified their borders and their culture, sentiments of nationalism began to develop. 
Yet, this nationalism is predicated on the idea that nations have an obligation first and 
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foremost to their citizens and citizens respond by giving a nation’s government its 
legitimacy. It is this form of nationalism that many modern populist movements have 
pointed to; essentially, the idea of ‘a government for the people and by the people’. 
 
The Fragment Theory 
 
 The “Fragment Theory” is the idea that fringe political parties are able to garner 
political support by dividing constituents of other parties on key political issues that are 
poorly addressed by mainstream parties. It is a “divide and conquer” political strategy 
that pulls from the disillusioned and disenfranchised voters of mainstream political 
parties. It has limited applicability in the United States given that the strategy is often 
used for the formation of new parties. Furthermore, the strength of both the Republican 
Party and the Democratic Party limits the accessibility for competing parties. However, 
within the United States the “fragment theory” is fairly effective at influencing policy 
through competing interest groups and grassroots movements. On the contrary, the 
“fragment theory” is much more applicable in Europe given that many nations have a 
multi-party system. Within these countries the ideological differences between the parties 
is much less drastic, the parties often require a coalition to govern, and the barrier for 
new parties is less severe. Thus, it creates a ripe atmosphere for new parties to emerge 
and pull constituents from existing parties. This section of the paper will examine the 
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“fragment theory” as it applies within the United States and Europe and how it affects 
policy and election outcomes.  
The Fragment Theory in the United States 
 The “fragment theory’s” limited applicability mainly stems from the dominance 
of the Republican Party and the Democratic Party, which have existed since the early 
1800’s. Yet, this is also largely the result of the adaptability of both parties. While rare, 
political shifts and the dual nature of the American political system allow for more 
flexibility within the parties and limited choices for the public. This in turn, limits the 
effect of the “fragment theory” introducing new political parties, but may also increases 
the effect that voting blocs can have. This is most notable with recent grassroots 
movements such as the Tea Party and Occupy Wall Street movements which have been 
explored earlier in this paper. Both were able to shift political discussion considerably. 
The Occupy Wall Street movement shifted the Democrat platform heavily around the 
ideas of corporate greed, wage disparities, and student loan debt. This very likely led to 
the rise of Bernie Sanders as a candidate, that would have been unlikely previously. The 
Tea Party movement shifted the Republican Party towards more conservative policies. 
Both of these movements fragmented the current political parties and, ultimately, 
demanded a change in platform from both Democrats and Republicans. Given the dual 
nature of the American political system, rather than the formation of new, competing 
parties like in Europe, this fragmentation led to responses from both parties. However, 
the Tea Party movement did lead to some discussion of new political parties and 
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ultimately several congressional blocs such as the Freedom Caucus and the Tea Party 
Caucus. Yet, the “fragment theory” in America is quite different than modern advocacy 
groups. Advocacy groups often advocate for a single issue or policy rather than a 
mainstream political shift which is seen with populist movements in the United States 
and also Europe. For example, the National Rifle Association is largely only concerned 
with gun rights for its constituency. The political ramifications are ultimately based on 
the political responses from each party. However, in the case of the Tea Party and 
Occupy movements, it was a large scale uprising from within the parties that demanded a 
political shift rather than outside advocacy groups. Thus, while the “fragment theory” has 
limited applicability in America, it often manifests in the form of political backlash from 
significant voting blocs within each party and demands a political response from within 
the parties rather than from outside. 
The Fragment Theory in Europe 
The “fragment theory” most aptly describes the success of populist movements 
within Europe. Eurosceptic groups have capitalized on a lack of representation and 
frustration that voters have felt towards mainstream political parties. The most notable 
example of the fragment theory has been the United Kingdom Independence Party. Led 
by Nigel Farage, UKIP exploded from a fringe movement to a major political rival for 
the Conservatives and Labour Party. UKIP first began in the early 1990’s when a 
significant schism occurred within the Conservative Party. Thatcher Conservatives and 
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Single-Market Conservatives disagreed on the issue of the party’s position towards the 
European Union. Conservatives universally supported the Single European Act of 1990 
which created a single market with the prospects of free trade. However, Thatcher 
Conservatives rejected the prospects of a united Europe and one that demanded economic 
and political integration. This sentiment of free trade and cooperation without further 
integration has been echoed by Farage and UKIP. However, this split was finalized when 
Thatcher was pushed out in 1990 and ultimately replaced with John Major, a 
Conservative who supported the Treaty of Maastricht on the grounds of the single-
market.5 This divide between Thatcher Conservatives and John Major Conservatives 
ultimately led to the creation of UKIP. Indeed, it was the Treaty of Maastricht that would 
ultimately change the direction of the European Union forever. Renee Buhr argues that 
the emergence of single-issue parties across Europe was only possible with the 
ratification of the Treaty of Maastricht. She argues, “while the radical right and far left 
may have had different reasons for opposing the Treaty of the European Union 
[Maastricht], they both took up this position in opposition to what many scholars have 
dubbed a pro-integration consensus among mainstream political parties. When radical 
right or left parties took up anti-integration positions, it appears they met the demands in 
that share of the electorate for this policy position. What is clear is that the share of the 
electorate voting for these parties, particularly the radical right, increased in number of 
                                                          
5 John Major was the Conservative Prime Minister who replaced Thatcher from 1992 to 1997. He was 
largely ineffective due to in-fighting within the Conservatives and his inability to quell it. 
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member states in the post-Maastricht era.” (Buhr, 2012). As Buhr notes, populists on 
both sides, the labor-based left and the far right had split from the more centrist 
ideologies of their previous mainstream parties. The Treaty of Maastricht ultimately 
created a situation in which mainstream parties that supported the treaty crashed towards 
the center towards integration while fringe parties or those that rejected the European 
Union were polarized to the extremes. She says, “radical right and far left parties were in 
an ideal position to address that share of the population that opposed new level of 
integration proposed by Maastricht, whether those objections were economic or identity-
based.” (Buhr, 2012). Thus, newly emerged Eurosceptic Parties were able to fulfill a 
unique political position, the ability to capture constituents from a wide array of political 
ideologies. Thus, Buhr’s argument affirms the initial foundations of the “fragment 
theory” that the divide between pro-EU and Eurosceptic parties was only possible as a 
result of the Treaty of Maastricht. Robert Ford and Matthew Goodwin also support this 
view. They argue, “It is this popular assumption that has led some commentators such as 
Matthew Parris, to reject the portrayal of UKIP as a political party in its own right, and to 
instead frame the movement as a ‘mutiny within Conservatism’. The reality, however, is 
quite different. Whether knowingly or not, Nigel Farage and his party have mobilized 
into politics, social and economic division that have existed for decades.” (Goodwin, 
2014). As UKIP continues to grow and succeed the assertion by Parris and others who 
claim UKIP is nothing more than a “mutiny” becomes more absurd. Simply on the basis 
that a significant portion of the UKIP voter-base are former Labour Party voters 
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demonstrates that it is more than a band of disgruntled Conservative voters. Ford and 
Goodwin support this claim, saying, “We find that UKIP has the most working-class 
following in British politics – the most working class following, in fact, since Michael 
Foot led the Labour Party in the 1983 general election. Aside from their social-
demographic profile, a detailed analysis of the motivations of UKIP voters revealed that 
most are driven by a ‘Brussels-plus’ outlook; while the party’s supporters are universally 
Eurosceptic, Euroscepticism alone is not enough to deliver many voters into UKIP’s 
camp – the vast majority combine hostility to the EU with strong concerns about 
immigration, dissatisfaction with the functioning of British politics, and negative views 
about the performance of both Labour and Conservatives on immigration and the post-
2008 financial crisis.” (Goodwin, 2014). Thus, the “fragment theory” aptly describes the 
rise of UKIP. It has risen beyond just a mere single-issue party based solely on the 
rejection of the European Union, but has also garnered considerable support because of 
the failures of other mainstream political parties.  
 
The Feedback Loop Theory 
 
 The “Feedback Loop” theory is the idea that the media and extremist candidates 
have a mutual symbiotic relationship. The media relies on extremist candidates for sound 
bites, ratings, and “clicks” to increase viewership and ultimately advertisement revenue. 
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Extremist candidates rely on the mainstream media for news coverage and legitimacy. 
The ability for Donald Trump to consistently appear in the news as “2016 Presidential 
hopeful” or “2016 Republican candidate” only served to legitimize his campaign. It is 
important to note that while Trump was largely a media creation, that does not 
necessarily mean he was well liked by the media. This section of the paper focuses on the 
“feedback loop” theory and the role of the media in populist movements.  
The Feedback Loop theory in American Politics  
The saying “there’s no such thing as bad press” certainly could not be more true 
for Donald Trump. The media often plays a crucial role in the rise of the extremist 
parties. The two intrinsically feed off each other. Donald Trump, in particular, was 
exceptional at drumming up outrage with his statements; yet these comments only 
seemed to fuel his popularity. For many, Trump was the candidate willing to say things 
no other candidate would dream of saying. They may not have agreed with him, but his 
rhetoric was a welcomed change to the almost robotic responses that had become 
commonplace in Washington D.C.  
Throughout the election cycle, the media gave considerable more coverage to the 
Trump campaign over the Clinton campaign. Trump’s rhetoric was often considered 
inflammatory by media elites, but additionally, his scandals received far more air time 
than Clinton’s scandals. According to a study by The Media Research Center, 91% of the 
coverage towards Trump was considered hostile (Noyes, 2016). They also found that 
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Trump received roughly 440 minutes of airtime compared to that of Clinton’s 185 
minutes of air time (Noyes, 2016). Donald Trump’s treatment of women received by far 
the most coverage, nearly double the amount of time that was allotted to the next two 
largest scandals. Two of Clinton’s largest scandals, the Clinton Foundation’s “pay-to-
play” scandal and the email scandal, received slightly more air time than several minor 
Trump scandals.  
 
Figure A 
The coverage marked considerable discrepancy in news coverage between the candidates 
and affirmed some of the criticisms of media bias. Yet, it also marked the effectiveness 
of the Trump campaign’s ability to create headlines. Trump and the Republican Party 
seemingly faced an insurmountable task of defeating Clinton and the ability for Trump to 
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remain a headline news story became a major driving force for his campaign. While he 
received a significantly more negative coverage, Trump was also able to keep Clinton out 
of the headlines. Figure A demonstrates how the “feedback loop” plays a significant role 
in both the types of coverage a candidate experiences and the amount of coverage a 
candidate receives. Many of Trump’s largely irrelevant controversies took up 
considerable air time. On the contrary, Clinton’s “deplorables” comment received only 
seven minutes of coverage and her handling of Benghazi as Secretary of State received 
less than two minutes of coverage. Trump was able to convert this heavily biased media 
coverage of Clinton into more air time for his own campaign. He criticized the media for 
its bias and called it “fake news” and claimed that the election was “rigged”. This in turn, 
created a media firestorm against Trump and thus, more air time. Yet, the move paid off 
for Trump not only with more coverage of his campaign but it exposed a deep distrust for 
the American media that had been long growing. According to a Quinnipiac University 
poll, nearly 55% of Americans felt that the media had an unfair bias against Trump 
(McCaskill, 2016). Of those polled, nearly 60% of those that identified as independent 
agreed that the media was biased against Trump. In a study by University of Indiana 
professors Lars Willnat and David H. Weaver, 60% of the American public feels that the 
news media is “headed in the wrong direction” (Willnat, 1). Thus, Trump was able to 
create considerable media outrage while also deflecting a large portion of this criticism as 
“fake” news. Ultimately, this allowed Donald Trump to discern which news was “true” 
and which was “fake”. Additionally, it created a situation in which virtually all of the 
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negative news coverage of Trump only confirmed his criticism and the American 
perception that the media was biased against him. This allowed Trump to deflect a large 
portion of criticism, and rather than damaging Trump’s campaign, it only served to fuel 
it.  
Despite overwhelmingly negative media coverage Trump still managed to do 
relatively well in the polls. Donald Trump and conservatives have criticized media 
coverage of Trump and fellow Republicans. According Lars Willnat and David Weaver, 
just 7% of reporters considered themselves Republicans compared to 28.1% that 
considered themselves Democrats (Willnat, 9). While the vast majority of reporters 
considered themselves Independent, the 7.1% marked a significant and consistent decline 
in the number of reporters identifying as Republican since the 1970’s. Examining Figure 
B, it becomes clear that Republican presence in the media has sharply declined and has 
fueled speculation and criticism from conservatives that the media is biased against 
Trump and the Republican Party. 
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Figure B 
While the number of reporters identifying as Democrat has also declined, the decline in 
representation has been far less drastic than the decline in Republican representation. 
Additionally, more reporters identify as Independent than in previous decades, yet as 
Willnat and Weaver point out, this is fairly consistent with the publics shift away from 
party identification. In addition to record low levels of Republican representation, media 
outlets became notorious for funding the Democratic party. George Stephanopoulos 
faced criticism for failing to disclose his $75,000 donation to the Clinton Foundation 
while reporting on both the Clinton Foundation and campaign (Gerstein, 2015). 
However, media outlets have donated to candidates throughout history; some questioned 
P a g e  | 29 
 
the criticism of journalists donating to major candidates. But to the American public, 
particularly Trump supporters and moderates, it appeared that the media and Clinton 
campaign were colluding for a Clinton victory. A study by the Center for Public Integrity 
found that journalists donated $396,000 between the candidates, Trump and Clinton. Of 
that $396,000 nearly all of it went to Clinton. The organization found that $382,000 or 
96% of all money donated in the 2016 Presidential election benefitted Clinton (Mills, 
2016). The report only confirmed what Trump, Pence and his supporters had railed 
against for months. For the rest of the American public, it called into question the 
media’s ability to be objective and unbiased.  
 The “feedback loop” theory created a perfect storm for the Trump campaign. 
Trump’s criticisms of the media and wild rhetoric kept his campaign in the headlines 
while the media also benefitted from these headlines. Yet, Trump was able to deflect a 
significant portion of the criticisms levied at his campaign because of a substantial 
amount of distrust between the public and the media. This in turn created a very lopsided 
“feedback loop” between the media and Trump. He was effectively able to benefit from 
the increased media exposure while deflecting a large amount of the criticism. This is a 
marked departure from other populist movements and candidates which are often 
subjected to heavy criticism in addition to increased media exposure. Trump largely 
nullified this criticism by focusing his campaign message around a “fake and biased” 
media and a Washington elite that was trying to preserve itself. 
P a g e  | 30 
 
The Feedback Loop Theory in European Politics 
UKIP and other populist movements have also experienced the same media 
sensationalism that Donald Trump has experienced. In a piece on New Statesman, 
Matthew Goodwin and Robert Ford argue “Farage receives a level of publicity that is not 
only disproportionate to his party’s actual strength, but also exceeds that given to other 
insurgents who have achieved what UKIP has not; a seat in Westminster.” (Goodwin, 
2013) Yet, despite UKIP and Farage’s failures at the national level, as Goodwin and Ford 
note, they have achieved resounding success at the European level. Figure C measures 
the number of citations for UKIP and Farage beginning in 2003, before UKIP had more 
than three MEPs, up until November 2013 when they were on the cusp of winning the 
2014 European Parliamentary elections outright.  
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Figure C 
“Clearly much of this marks a response to UKIP’s growth in the polls. But whereas UKIP 
enjoyed record gains in 2004 and 2009, the media attention it won after these 
breakthroughs is dwarfed by the wave of coverage it received in the past two years. In 
2012, UKIP mentions reached a record high of over 10,000, but so far in 2013 this figure 
has already more than doubled again, with two months of the year still left to run.” 
(Goodwin, 2013) Ford and Goodwin also measure UKIP’s media coverage in relation to 
other fringe parties. 
 
Figure D 
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Despite considerable growth for UKIP in 2004 and 2009, it remained relatively 
consistent in media coverage with other fringe parties until 2011 when it came unto its 
own. While Goodwin and Ford assert that UKIP and Farage have received media 
coverage exceeding its representation, Figure D seems to indicate the contrary for the 
first several years of UKIP’s rise. Rather, UKIP was seemingly underrepresented by the 
media until roughly 2011, especially in comparison to fringe counterparts, such as the 
Greens and British National Party (BNP) which have been relatively invisible to the 
public. Goodwin and Ford also measured Farage’s representation in comparison to other 
fringe leaders. 
 
Figure E 
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As they noted, Farage was relatively obscure until 2012 in which he saw significant 
media coverage. Once again, Farage was fairly underrepresented given the status of 
UKIP relative to other fringe parties. Goodwin and Ford’s research seems to indicate that 
UKIP was not given the same recognition as mainstream parties despite significant gains 
in 2004 and 2009. However, in 2012 both Farage and UKIP noticed a meteoric rise in 
coverage.  While UKIP has largely been considered a fringe party since its inception, it 
was undeniable that it had transcended to a major political force.  
 
The Populist Revolt of 2016 and the Future of Populism 
 
 2016 noted a remarkable year in populist backlash. While populist movements 
have seen success sporadically throughout history, they are increasingly effective at 
introducing both political and social change. Given the success of populist movements in 
Europe and recently the United States, it begs the question if political parties are fading 
in favor political movements. This portion of the paper examines why Trump won the 
2016 presidential election, why Europe is a populist hotbed, and the future of populism.  
The Triumph of Trump 
 Donald Trump was largely the product of being the right candidate at the right 
time. He knew how to play the political game and perhaps unknowingly tapped into a 
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political force that felt disdain for political elites. Donald Trump is an elite, but he was 
also a political outsider that was seemingly resented by both establishment Republicans 
and establishment Democrats. For Republicans, he was a loose cannon and a candidate 
that was unknown for his celebrity status rather than political prowess. Many in the 
Republican camp feared his wild rhetoric and lack of political expertise would be 
difficult to overcome, especially with the likelihood of an experienced Clinton campaign. 
Democrats underestimated Trump’s appeal to working-class Americans and the weakness 
of the Clinton strategy. Yet, even some prominent Democrat figures worried about 
Trump. Michael Moore, in his documentary, Trumpland, predicted that states such as 
Iowa, Wisconsin, Michigan, Ohio, and Pennsylvania would go in favor of Trump. He 
called them the “Brexit states” because he predicted they would shock the nation by 
giving Trump the presidency. He said,  
“I know a lot of people in Michigan that are planning to vote for Trump. They 
don’t necessarily like him that much and they don’t necessarily agree with him. 
They’re not bad people; they’re not racists or rednecks. They’re actually pretty 
decent people. Donald Trump came to the Detroit economic club and stood there 
in front of a Ford executive and said, ‘if you close these factories, as you are 
planning to do in Detroit, and build them in Mexico, I’m going to put a 35% tariff 
on those cars when you send them back and no one is going to buy them’. It was 
an amazing thing to see. No politician, Democrat or Republican, had ever said 
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anything like that to these executives. It was music to the ears of the people of 
Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin; the Brexit states… It’s why every 
beaten down, nameless, forgotten working stiff who used to be part of what was 
called the middle class loves Trump. He is the human Molotov cocktail that 
they’ve been waiting for. The human hand grenade they can legally throw into the 
system that stole their lives from them. And on November 8th, election day, 
although they lost their jobs, although they’ve been foreclosed on by the bank, 
next came the divorce, and now the wife and kids are gone. The car has been 
repo’d, they haven’t had a real vacation in years, they’re stuck with the shitty 
Obamacare bronze plan where you can’t even get a fucking Percocet. They have 
essentially lost everything they had except one the thing. The one thing that 
doesn’t cost them a cent and is guaranteed to them by the American Constitution; 
the right to vote. They might be penniless, they might be homeless, they might be 
fucked over or fucked up, but it doesn’t matter because it’s equalized on that day. 
A millionaire has the same number of votes as a person without a job, one. And 
there’s more of the former middle class than there are of the millionaires.” 
(Moore, 2016) 
Moore noted the sentiments that many blue-collar workers in middle America felt. 
Whether Donald Trump truly meant to keep his promises was irrelevant to the 
disenfranchised, white voters in the Rust Belt. He was saying the things that no politician 
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had said to them. Certainly, neither Clinton nor the Democratic Party were going to 
promise to bring the jobs to their factories. Journalist John Heilemann in his special The 
Circus shared Michael Moore’s sentiments on election night. “For about half the country, 
their lives have sucked for the past 25 years while the rest of us have been doing fine. 
They have no real hope that their lives are going to get better and their attitude was, ‘you 
know what, that guy is risky, but doing the same thing over and over again for the next 
20 years that we’ve done for the last 20 years and didn’t fix anything, that’s risky too. 
I’m willing to take these risks and roll a stick of dynamite into Washington D.C. and 
blow it up and see where the rubble falls’…. Really it’s the collapse of trust in all 
institutions that is playing across all western democracies.” (Heilemann, 2016) Perhaps 
the coastal elites were oblivious to the struggle that millions of working class voters in 
the Midwest had felt for the better part of the past decade. Most working-class Americans 
had felt their lifestyle had declined considerably. According to the Public Religion 
Research Institute (PRRI), which measured the 2016 election in their piece Beyond 
Economies: Fears of Cultural Displacement Pushed the White Working Class to Trump, 
nearly as many white working-class voters had felt their lifestyle had declined as it had 
improved. This is in considerable contrast to college-educated white voters who are 
nearly three times as likely to say their financial circumstances have improved since 
childhood. (Cox, 2017) Yet, what is perhaps most remarkable about Figure F is the 
contrast between older working-class voters and younger voters. If the Age 65+ bracket 
was to be isolated, the clear majority of white working-class voters between the ages of 
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18 and 64 have noticed a decline in their financial circumstance. The fact that nearly half 
of all working-class voters have expressed a stagnation in financial standards is enough to 
warrant concern on its own. However, even more telling, according to PRRI, an equal 
number of working-class and college-educated voters, approximately 44%, reported that 
their social standing has remained the same from childhood to adulthood.  
 
Figure F 
Despite the struggles of millions of working-class voters, the Clinton strategy did not 
seem to involve white, blue-collar voters at all. As noted by Doug Wead in his book 
Game of Thorns, Hillary Clinton ignored many of the voters that her husband, Bill, had 
relied on in his road to the White House. He says, “They [the Clintons] were deaf to the 
needs of the blue-collar voters who had lost their jobs all across America. It was one 
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thing to say in public, out of loyalty, that things were great, but Obama wasn’t running, 
she was running, and people didn’t believe things were great. Whatever happened to ‘it’s 
the economy stupid’?” (Wead, 36) For the Clinton campaign, the economy and hurting 
workers of America seemed to be the last thing on her mind. Hillary seemed more 
focused on trying to persuade minority voters, who had ushered Barack Obama into the 
White House, to vote for her. She had not only ignored these voters, but in some 
instances outright rejected them. Wead noted this rejection with Catholic organizations. 
“Bill Clinton was reportedly still furious over the campaign’s refusal to speak at a Saint 
Patrick’s Day event months earlier at Notre Dame. Catholics wanted to vote for them, if 
the campaign would just give them a chance. It was as if Hillary’s campaign didn’t want 
them.” (Wead, 36) Trump faced considerable criticism from Christian groups, 
particularly Evangelical groups for his multitude of marriages and comments regarding 
the treatment of women. Yet, Trump knew he needed Evangelical Christians in his 
constituency, particularly because most of them hailed from the Midwest and South were 
he drew much of his support. According to the PRRI, nearly 71% of white working-class 
Americans identified as Christian. Despite the fact that many young working-class voters 
are religiously unaffiliated, Clinton’s decision to ignore such a significant portion of the 
voter-base proved detrimental (Cox, 2017).  
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The Rise of Populist Europe 
 The most notable political success for populist movements comes in Europe. 
European populism is often characterized as Euroscepticism. Euroscepticism is a 
rejection of the idea of an integrated Europe and the belief in national sovereignty as 
opposed to supranational entities. This ideology is a total rejection of the formation of the 
European Union rather than merely skepticism towards a Brussel’s-centered political 
union. This important distinction is what separates parties like the United Kingdom 
Independence Party or National Front in France from other parties such as the Tories. 
The primary objective of Eurosceptic parties is to oversee the disintegration of the 
European Union. On the contrary some parties, such as the En Marche! are more 
skeptical when dealing with Brussels, but are still pro-EU. This distinction is crucial 
because it sets the tone for these political movements both in local elections as well as the 
European Parliament. The European Freedom and Direct Democracy group, which is at 
the center of Euroscepticism in the European Parliament, has been the most successful 
Eurosceptic bloc.6 The European Union is heavily criticized for being fairly unresponsive 
to democratic concerns or opinions. At the root of this criticism are the structural 
problems the EU faces that make it difficult to respond to public demands. While many 
                                                          
6 The European Freedom and Direct Democracy group is sometimes referred to as the EFDD or their 
previous acronym, EFD, which was European Freedom and Democracy. They rebranded to the “Direct 
Democracy” tag to emphasize the popular vote. It is also important to note that while a voting bloc, they 
are composed of individual MEPs and a plurality of parties, they themselves are not a single entity nor 
does that mean they necessarily vote like one. 
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EU institutions and even citizens can contribute and influence the law, it is only the 
European Commission that can submit proposals to parliament. The Commission is also 
responsible for setting the legislative agenda. This in turn, creates a bottleneck effect in 
which the commissioner is the only official who can bring forth new laws. While the 
President of the EU, head of the European Commission, is an elected position, the 
president is elected via secret ballot by the 28 other officials in the EU Commission. One 
of the hallmarks of a representative democracy is examining how a representative voted 
and holding them accountable for their vote. European officials are not accountable to the 
European public for their vote and ultimately, because the commission is the only body 
that can bring forth legislation, it essentially allows legislation to be brought to a vote 
without any accountability. This process is further complicated by the fact that the 
European Union has a mechanism for a secret ballot on legislation. According to the 
European Union’s Rule 169, “any vote may be subject to secret ballot should at least one-
fifth of the parliament motion before the vote begins.” (Europarl, 2013) In essence, the 
Commission is not accountable for the legislation that is put forth, nor is the legislative 
body, the European Parliament, responsible for the way it votes. This has created an 
elevated level of distrust between the European populace and the European Parliament. 
While it is often used sparingly by the parliamentary body, it has occurred on a number 
of occasions since the 2008 financial crisis. Secret ballot motions are most frequently 
called for budgetary concerns. In 2013, then-President Martin Schulz of Germany 
P a g e  | 41 
 
motioned for and granted a secret ballot for the European Union’s 2014 budget. He 
argued “that an eventual agreement would not be an ‘end point’ but a basis for 
negotiations with the parliament for introducing more flexibility into the EU budget.” 
(Euractiv, 2013) While Schulz may refer to this as flexibility, members of the European 
Conservatives and Reformists group (ERC) argued that this flexibility was only possible 
as a resultant of removing accountability. Martin Callanan said, "This kind of behaviour 
brings the EU and politicians into disrepute. My group will argue for a Roll Call Vote on 
any deal reached so that all MEPs can stand on the doorsteps in their constituencies and 
explain why they cannot support their Prime Minister." (Euractiv, 2013) Given that the 
budget is one of the most contentious and politically divisive issues in both European and 
America, it stands to reason the European public would be outraged. Furthermore, it 
exemplifies the disconnect between the European political elite’s thoughts on their role 
versus the public’s thoughts. Schulz highlights what Lukacs has called this form of 
“liberal elitism” which is to believe that there is a ruling elite that decides what is best for 
the public. On the basis that Schulz believes a private vote would give a major political 
advantage for their votes, it is evident that this distrust of the Democratic process is two-
fold. The political elite do not trust the public and vice versa.   
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the European Union has been the economy. 
The initial founding of the European Union, the European Community, after World War 
II was based on maintaining peace and trade relationships between European countries. 
However, nearly four decades later, at the Treaty of Maastricht, the European 
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Community decided to adopt the Euro as the official currency for the European Union. 
The origination of the Euro is rooted in the attempt to prevent the domination of the 
Deutschmark across all of Europe. Yet, in effect, following the 2008 financial crisis, the 
Euro only re-affirmed the domination of German banks and the German Euro. Because 
the Euro is the currency for a multitude of nations, no nation individually has the 
capability of devaluing its currency. This proved crucial in extending and exacerbating 
the financial crisis in already struggling economies. The most notable will be Greece, a 
country which adopted the Euro in 2001 under false pretenses and banking irregularities 
which would later be exposed. In addition to Greece, other countries including Ireland, 
Spain, Portugal, and Italy have faced their own economic struggles following the 2008 
financial collapse. Given the economic struggles, many in these countries have turned to 
blame the European Union and the European Central Bank for the financial crisis. 
Naturally, these countries are hotbeds for Eurosceptic groups. While most countries have 
only one Eurosceptic group, Greece has a multitude of Eurosceptic groups almost 
entirely because of the fiscal situation in Greece. Former Greek finance minister Yanis 
Varoufakis spoke out vehemently about Greek financial instability and attempts by the 
European Union to relieve this debt. In an interview with Dave Rubin on The Rubin 
Report, Varoufakis noted that he was not in favor of the Euro initially, but believes it is 
now “too late to turn back”. He said: 
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“Back in the late 1900’s, a remarkable experiment in monetary economics took 
place in Europe. In our infinite wisdom, we Europeans tried to bind monetarily 
together, very different economies without any mechanism for deciding surpluses, 
for keeping checks and balances in capital inflows and outflows. Any kind of 
economic union was askewed and put on the backburner, while pushing forward 
in monetary union…… What happens, in every economy, in every currency 
union, there are surplus areas, like California and there are deficit areas like 
Missouri. In Europe, it’s Germany and Greece. Within Germany it’s Eastern 
Germany and Western Germany… and when that happens in a monetary union, 
there is a tendency for surpluses to travel to deficit areas in the form of loans. By 
definition, Germany always has and always will be a surplus country in relation to 
Greece, and what do bankers do when they have a surplus? The money comes in 
and it effectively beefs up asset prices, house prices and various other assets. That 
creates a semblance of growth… it really is nothing more than a Ponzi scheme.” 
(Varoufakis, 2017) 
Varoufakis highlights what some critics have noted as a fundamentally flawed monetary 
union. The Eurozone features countries with wildly different economies and industries. 
For Greece in particular, its largest industry is the tourism industry and as a result, is hit 
particularly hard by economic recessions. Yet, what further exacerbates these issues is 
the inability for Greece or any Eurozone country to devalue its currency in the wake of an 
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economic decline. Thus, given the substantial decline in the Greek economy and the 
failures of Greek banks, there once again became a divide between the strength of the 
Germany Euro and the Greek Euro. Varoufakis explains how this problem became 
significantly worse at the hands of European officials: 
“You cannot do what Argentina did; you cannot sever the peg and devalue the 
currency… so the creditors come here, and this is the crime against logic that was 
committed in May of 2010; we had the Greek state which was bankrupt, there 
was no way it could overthrow its debt, it did not have a currency it could 
devalue, and it did not have a central bank. Imagine 2008 in the United States 
without the Fed and without the capacity to devalue the dollar. So, what did they 
do? It is quite astonishing, they came to the Greek state and said, ‘we will bail 
you out’, but of course it wasn’t even a bail out, what they did was they gave to 
the Greek state the largest amount of money in humanity’s history in absolute 
terms. Remember Greece is a tiny little place, 2% of the European economy, it’s 
the Delaware of Europe. Imagine if the powers that be; the IMF, the Fed, the 
Treasury, the World Bank to descend upon Delaware and gave them the largest 
sum in human history on conditions of austerity [that] are guaranteed to shrink the 
income of the people living there… What I think most Americans understand is 
that you cannot escape bankruptcy through loans.”  (Varoufakis, 2017) 
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What Varoufakis does not disclose is that Greece was “bailed out” numerous times 
during this financial crisis, each time through the condition of austerity and loans. This 
crippled the Greek economy even further and he believed that European officials have a 
flawed perspective and incorrectly believed that Greece economic woes could be 
alleviated through loans. Yet, these failures also came on the heels of Greek banking 
irregularities prior to joining the Euro. The fault lines were initially realized in 2004 
when Greek ministers admitted to falsifying data to gain entry into the Eurozone. This 
subsequently set off a chain reaction in which Italian, Portuguese, and Spanish banks also 
reported irregularities. Former European President Jose Manuel Barroso blamed North 
America for the 2008 financial crisis at the G20 summit in 2012 (The Telegraph, 2012), 
and to some degree he was correct. However, that criticism was lost on the working 
classes and unemployed in those countries. Greece and Spain have consistently 
maintained the highest levels of unemployment in Europe, often exceeding over 25%. 
Furthermore, it ignores the structural problems the Euro faced. While Barroso may not 
admit it, the structure of the Euro largely exacerbated the crisis as did the response by the 
European Bank. 
The Future of Populism 
It has been said, “if you’re not a liberal at twenty, you have no heart. If you are 
not a conservative at thirty-five, you have no brain.” However, today’s young voters may 
already be going on thirty-five. Recent studies indicate that young voters are more 
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conservative now than in previous generations. If populism is going to have a lasting 
impact on the political landscape, young voters are going to have to be the demographic 
that carries it forward in the 21st century. A study published in the British Journal of 
Political Sciences found that young British voters are “exceptionally more conservative” 
than previous generations. The study led by Stephen Farrall et al. suggested that 
Margaret Thatcher and the ideas of “Thatcherism” had a significant impact on young 
people’s views of welfare, crime, and the economy. (Farrall, 17) Thatcher, a Eurosceptic 
herself, would seemingly have also influenced young voters opinions of the European 
Union. However, despite young voters “becoming more conservative” Eurosceptic 
candidate Nigel Farage and UKIP flopped with them. Other populist candidates, Trump 
and Geert Wilders, also did quite poorly with young voters. The only populist candidate 
who did well with young voters was Marine Le Pen. The Financial Times reported that 
Le Pen managed to claim a remarkable 39% of young voters while her competitors 
Macron sat at 21% and Francois Fillon trailed with an abysmal 9% of young French 
voters (“39% of French youngster backing Le Pen”, 2017). This marked departure from 
the norm, signifies a unique set of problems facing young French voters. While both 
Macron and Le Pen have noted that high youth unemployment is a problem for France, 
Le Pen has made it a focal point in her campaign while other French presidential 
candidates did not. With youth unemployment stuck at nearly 25% for the past few years 
in France, it has also been a focal point for young voters as well. Gaëtan Dussausaye, the 
23-year-old youth leader of National Front, said “we’ve been told our whole lives that 
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everything is set. Free trade. Forgetting our borders. One currency for all of Europe. 
Nothing can change. But young people don’t like this system. This system is a failure.” 
(White, 2017) While young voters are seemingly less concerned with immigration, the 
free movement of peoples, and multi-culturalism, for the French voters, the Euro 
represents a real threat to their economic prospects. Despite Le Pens being considered far 
right, she has taken on many social policies when it comes to the economy; some of these 
positions are even supported by socialist parties. Particularly her policies regarding the 
regulation of bread prices, her tariff policies, and policies regarding youth unemployment 
that made her a popular candidate among some voters. Furthermore, Le Pen has led 
National Front beyond its deep anti-Semitic and white nationalist views espoused by her 
father and previous candidates. Le Pen even went as far as to ban her father from the 
party and kicked out all other white supremacists and anti-Semites.  Young voters were 
too young to vote for her father in the 2002 French presidential elections and they were 
too young to remember National Front as a party of racism. Despite this, Marine Le 
Pen’s bid for the French Presidency failed, alongside Geert Wilders’ bid for the Dutch 
prime minister position, both of which were substantial setbacks for populism in 2017.  
There is no doubt, Europe is becoming more right-wing. It appears that since 
2000 the message of globalism has been declining quite rapidly in appeal. While 2016 
may appear to be the outlier, make no mistake, populist sentiments have been building 
over time. The success of the UKIP, National Front, Five Star Movement, among many 
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others indicates that populism, at least in Europe, may be a long-term reality. The New 
York Times measured precisely how far to the right Europe has shifted. Out of the twenty 
countries they examined nearly all of them had experienced a growth in right-wing 
sentiments or remained relatively steady. 
 
Figure G 
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Examining Figure G, only Spain and Portugal have not had a significant growth in right-
wing success.7 The most notable growth in right-wing ideology is in Austria, Hungary, 
and Poland which have seen marked increases. (Aisch, 2017) It is important to note that 
this view into Europe is fairly limited in explaining populism, while populism in the 
United States is almost exclusively limited to right wing ideology, in Europe it is much 
more nuanced and diverse given the prominence of labor parties which generally fear the 
free movement of peoples and goods. While Greece has not seen a dramatic rise in right-
wing parties, it has seen a dramatic rise in populist and Eurosceptic parties which have 
many of the same goals as populist, right-wing parties. Additionally, given the 
uncertainty of Hungary, Austria, and Poland’s membership in the European Union, 
Eurosceptic populism may score another serious victory in the near future. If any of these 
nations were to leave the European Union in addition to Britain, it would raise 
fundamental questions about both the legitimacy and longevity of the European Union. 
While the financial crisis certainly left a black mark on the European Union and 
economic integration, it has recently been the migrant crisis that has propelled these 
nations to the brink of leaving the European Union. The future of populism in Europe 
hinges on decisions made surrounding these issues. If the migrant crisis continues to pose 
                                                          
7 This is very likely due to Spanish history with dictatorship and far right-wing ideology. However, it is 
worth noting that the political party Podemos, a left-wing populist party, has had marginal success. There 
are Eurosceptic movements in Spain, however most of them are left leaning ironically. 
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as a central issue for these nations and a compromise cannot be reached, it poses a 
serious threat to the survival of the European Union.  
In America, while Trump performed quite poorly with younger voters, among 
white, working-class voters he did quite well. The PRRI, found a significant gap between 
young, working-class voters and their generational counterparts. Nearly 57% of white, 
working-class young adults identified as Republican, while only 29% identify as 
Democrat (Cox, 2017). What is also remarkable is the generational gap between younger 
and older working-class voters in which there is a considerably higher number of voters 
who strongly identify as Democrat. Furthermore, the PRRI study found that young, 
working-class adults are more than twice as likely to identify as conservative. Nearly 
43% of young, working-class voters identified as conservative while only 21% identified 
as liberal (Cox, 2017).  
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Figure H 
Historian Yuval Noah Harari describes this as the new political divide. He even 
went as far as to say the idea of right and left is largely irrelevant, “The old, 20th century 
political model of left versus right is largely irrelevant and the real divide today is 
between global and national or global and local.” (Harari, 2017) In his TED Talk, he 
explained why this shift occurred. “Humans think in stories and we try to make sense of 
the world by telling stories. And for the last few decades, we had a very simple and 
attractive story about what is happening in the world. And the story said, what is 
happening is that the economy is being globalized, politics is being liberalized, and the 
combination of the two will create paradise on Earth. And we just need to keep 
globalizing the economy and liberalizing the system and everything will be wonderful. 
2016 was when a good portion of the world stopped believing in this story.” It was not 
necessarily that substantial portions of the population stopped believing in the story as 
much as an outright rejection of the story. It is now clear that the populists largely feel 
that globalization has gone too far, and in some instances nations have sacrificed too 
much for the sake of globalization. Part of this assessment is undeniable; when nations 
join supranational entities they inevitably give up some national sovereignty. This is most 
evident with the European Union, which by the nature of membership, demands further 
integration. In essence, the European Union demands that countries give up some degree 
of national sovereignty to become a member. This is particularly troubling especially 
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with the economic crisis and migrant crisis which has resulted in a significant divide 
within the European Union. Harari said, “I think the underlying feeling is that something 
is broken within the political system, it does not empower the ordinary person anymore, 
it does not care so much about the ordinary person anymore, and I think this diagnosis of 
the political disease is correct… I think what we are seeing is the natural human reaction, 
if something doesn’t work, let us go back.” (Harari, 2017) Perhaps Harari is correct, and 
the natural reaction is to turn away from globalism to nationalism. However, his 
comments reveal that perhaps there are significant problems with the way globalism has 
developed, particularly recently. He asserts, “Nationalism is not sufficient to tackle 
global problems, such as climate change or technological disruption, that globalism is 
capable of tackling… All of the major problems of the world today are global, in essence, 
and they cannot be solved without some kind of global cooperation.” (Harari, 2017) 
However, what Yuval Harari fails to recognize is that there are substantial problems 
caused by extreme globalization that perhaps only nationalism can address. It may be true 
that climate change and nuclear threats are best dealt with on a global level, but there 
must also be a recognition that some problems, such as economic or immigration issues 
cannot be tackled at a supranational level. As Harari argues, nationalism and patriotism 
do have their place. He notes that nationalism has become increasingly conflated with 
extremism; all forms of nationalism have been conflated with ethno-nationalism which is 
a dangerous proposition itself. Harari concludes, “For many centuries, even thousands of 
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years, patriotism worked quite well. Of course, it led to some wars, but we shouldn’t 
focus too much on that, there are also many positive things from patriotism and the 
ability for a large number of people to care about each other, sympathize for one another, 
and come together for collective action.” (Harari, 2017) 
 
Final Thoughts 
 
This paper has served to provide an overview of the populism phenomena and 
explain its appeal. While I have intended for this paper to serve as a comprehensive 
overview of populism and Euroscepticism, it is also with the understanding that these are 
broad and deep topics that a single paper cannot fully explore. Thus, I have tried to 
explain two fundamental roots of populism: the “fragment theory” and the “feedback 
loop.” Yet, there are areas which can further be explored on this topic. First and most 
prominently is a further exploration of modern populism, particularly the Tea Party 
movement and Occupy Wall Street movement. While Richard Hofstadter’s work on 
populism in the late 1800’s and early 1900’s may have shed insight into early American 
populism, there is a lack of literature for 21st century populism, particularly within the 
United States. The second area of research which could be further explored surrounds 
Euroscepticism outside of Britain. There is a great deal of literature about British 
Euroscepticism and Britain’s unique, separate identity from mainland Europe. However, 
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given the recent success of Eurosceptic groups in countries such as Greece, Austria, 
Hungary, and Poland, there is a lack of literature dealing with the recent rise of 
Euroscepticism across the mainland continent. The third area in which research can be 
expanded is within the “fragment theory.” As noted by this paper, the fragment theory 
applies well to the European Union and particularly Eurosceptic groups, but given the 
narrow scope of populism within this paper it would be interesting if this model will hold 
up among other fringe movements and political ideologies.  
Populism is undoubtedly one of the most important political phenomena as we 
move further into the 21st Century. Its rise has not been an isolated incident, but rather an 
accumulation of failures by politicians and political elites to address severe economic and 
social issues. Historically, populist revolts have often been a sign of major political and 
social upheaval and we are witnessing this upheaval unfold in real time. The significance 
of events such as the election of Donald Trump and Brexit should not be lost merely as 
populist backlashes, but rather the first movements of a massive political shift. 
Populism’s future, however, is far from certain. Given such political volatility and the 
penchant for young voters to reject populism, the sustainability of current iterations of 
populist backlash seems unlikely. However, as this paper has demonstrated, that does not 
preclude populist backlashes from occurring in the future, rather the opposite.  
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